This article examines the development and impact of German citizenship policy over the past 
Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the study of citizenship in the developed world has been enriched by a major new sub-field: the analysis and explanation of patterns of and policies towards the acquisition of membership, both at birth and via naturalisation. The corpus of scholarship in this area is now substantial and nuanced, and in the context of European nation-states encompasses a wide range of aspects, including comparative empirical analyses (e.g.
3
Brubaker 1989, Hansen and Weil 2001, Bauböck et al. 2006) , taxonomies of naturalisation regimes (e.g. Howard 2009 ) and detailed national case studies (e.g. Hansen 2000 , Weil 2008 , Green 2004 ).
Yet despite the wealth of scholarship on this area, the question of how access to nationality is structured politically, legally and philosophically remains as germane now as it has been at any time over the past two decades. This has two key reasons. First, and notwithstanding a 'postnational' turn in the 1990s (Soysal 1994 , Sassen 1996 , Jacobsen 1996 which held that globalisation and the widespread availability of social citizenship rights independently of membership rendered national citizenships irrelevant, nationality (still) matters. As Howard (2009, pp. 6-8) shows, certain rights of real significance, such as unconstrained residence and access to public sector employment, remain the exclusive preserve of full membership.
Second, in the European context, national citizenship remains the sole route to the acquisition of citizenship of the European Union (EU). When combined with the growing chasm in rights between those who are EU citizens and so-called 'Third Country Nationals' (TCNs), the conditions under which the citizenship of an EU member-state can be gained are of direct relevance to the estimated 20 million TCNs resident in the EU in 2009. In consequence, the content, application and impact of individual national citizenship policies remain very much a live issue.
Over the course of these past twenty years, two distinct phases are conventionally identified in the evolution of citizenship policies in Europe (Joppke 2010, Chapter 2) . First, during the 1990s, there was a broad liberalisation of access, as countries responded to the reality of permanent migrant communities in their territories. This took a number of forms, including the introduction of the territorial principle of ascription (jus soli) alongside the principle of 4 descent (jus sanguinis) and the more widespread tolerance of dual and multiple citizenships (Vink and de Groot 2010) . In fact, this led to an (uncoordinated) convergence of nationality policies in Europe (Hansen and Weil 2001, Bauböck et al. 2006) . Since 2001, the emphasis has shifted clearly away from opening up access, albeit gradually and not uniformly throughout Europe, towards a 'thickening' of citizenship, with many countries successively introducing assimilatory elements such as language and citizenship tests, integration courses and citizenship ceremonies (Goodman 2010) . Notably though, this changed emphasis has not necessarily come at the expense of numbers naturalised: as Howard (2009, p. 217) shows, between 1985-90 and 2000-05, naturalisation rates, which express the annual proportion of a country's non-national population acquiring citizenship, rose in eleven of fifteen EU memberstates.
Against this background, the aim of this article is to discuss the development of one national citizenship in particular, namely that of Germany. While broad cross-national comparisons help us to understand overall trends, it requires a detailed case study such as this to tease out the nuances and fine details of individual citizenship policies. And Germany constitutes a particularly interesting case study, for three main reasons. First and foremost, citizenship in Germany has conventionally been considered as the paradigmatic example of an 'ethnocultural' definition of citizenship (Brubaker 1992) , with an associated high degree of exclusivity in terms of access for non-nationals. In practice, this meant that Germany relied exclusively on the principle of descent (jus sanguinis) for ascription at birth, with the territorial principle (jus soli) completely absent; as Kay Hailbronner, in one of the early discussions of German citizenship policy in English, asserted, 'the German conception of citizenship and nationhood is better expressed in the principle of jus sanguinis' (Hailbronner 1989, p. 77) . In parallel, naturalisation was to be an exceptional act, which therefore justified 5 high assimilatory requirements on the part of applicants, including long periods of residence, the payment of high fees and the rejection of dual and multiple citizenships (Green 2004, pp. 39-41) . In consequence, the numbers of non-nationals actually becoming Germans remained negligibly low, and failed to rise above 20,000 throughout the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in annual naturalisation rates of below 0.5 per cent throughout this time.
Second, the last full reform of German citizenship, which took place in 1999 and came into force on 1 January 2000, was of major symbolic and political significance. Its predecessor, the 1913 Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (RuStAG) had been on the statute books continuously since 1914. Not only did the law epitomise the then ethnocultural nature of German citizenship, having survived both the Weimar Republic and National Socialism to be adopted by West Germany (Brubaker 1992) , but in doing so it also constituted a direct link between the new, unified Germany and the Third Reich. Politically, the law represented the culmination of a protracted process spanning almost twenty years (Green 2004) . Even the law's passage through parliament during 1999 had been marred by controversy, when the conservative CDU ran its now notorious petition campaign against the SPD-Green federal government's original plans to allow dual citizenships on an unrestricted basis (Howard 2008, pp. 46-52) . Given that in 2010 the law had been in force for ten years, this article takes this opportunity to assess the law's subsequent evolution and impact in practice.
But the third reason for looking at Germany is arguably the most significant: at almost 6.7 million persons in 2009, Germany is home to by far the largest non-national population in the EU.
1 By definition, therefore, naturalisation and citizenship policy matters. What is more, almost two-thirds of this total, or 4.3 million persons, are TCNs, including some 1.7 million Turkish nationals. Given that, therefore, over one-fifth of all the EU's TCNs reside in 6 Germany, its provisions for and practice of citizenship acquisition is a key determinant of access to EU citizenship and the associated rights for this group.
This article proceeds as follows. It begins by briefly sketching out the content of the 2000 law, before discussing subsequent amendments to it, with particular emphasis on reforms in 2004 and 2007. It then discusses the law's quantitative impact, and asks why this has been much lower than had originally been anticipated. Subsequently, the article moves to outlining some of the other issues which have emerged in citizenship policy before concluding with some thoughts on the future direction of German citizenship in the twenty-first century.
The content of Germany's 2000 Citizenship Law
Although it technically constituted an amendment of the RuStAG rather than a complete new piece of legislation, there can be little doubt that the 2000 law (or Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) fundamentally reformed access to German citizenship in three key ways (cf. Green 2000) .
First, while the three principal established routes to naturalisation, via state discretion (Ermessenseinbürgerung), marriage to a German national or legal entitlement (Anspruchseinbürgerung), were retained together with their respective requirements, the 2000 law practically halved, from fifteen to eight years, the residence period required in order to qualify for the latter. The importance of this reduction should not be underestimated, as over two-thirds of all naturalisations fall under the category of legal entitlement, compared to less than 15 per cent for the other two categories combined (Worbs 2008, pp. 19-20) . Moreover, with almost two-thirds of the non-national population in 2000 having residence periods of over eight years, compared to 40 per cent with over fifteen years, the potential population 7 eligible for naturalisation, at least in terms of residence periods, increased at a stroke by more than half.
2 Second, the law introduced jus soli for the first time in the history of German citizenship.
Hitherto, the exclusive reliance on jus sanguinis meant that successive generations of migrants' descendants were born in Germany without automatic access to full citizenship rights; in 2009, they accounted for almost one-fifth of the total non-national population.
However, from 2000, all children of non-nationals where one parent had eight years' residence and was in possession of a permanent residence status became German at birth.
Over and above this, the law also provided for a transitional arrangement granting children born after 1 January 1990, i.e. 10 years before the new citizenship law came into force, the right to register as German nationals under the same conditions. Lastly, although the law continued Germany's long tradition of rejecting dual citizenship in naturalisations, it introduced some new exceptions to this rule, covering recognised refugees, the over 60s and nationals of certain EU member-states (see below).
However, these liberalisations were not as unequivocal as they seemed at first sight. Most of all, the introduction of jus soli was in reality closely circumscribed. Thus, the requirement for one parent to hold a permanent residence status has proved to be a highly significant barrier, conclusion to the process of naturalisation (Topçu 2007, pp. 58-61) ; in doing so, they have provided a contrast to the rather defensive nature of the referral of applications to the security service and the declaration of constitutional loyalty.
A second issue concerned the automatic toleration of dual citizenship in applicants from certain EU member-states. Together, these four areas were incorporated into a second reform, which came into effect in early 2007 and which therefore constitutes the altogether more significant of the two post-2000 amendments to citizenship policy: 4
• As a rule, applicants for naturalisation are now required to demonstrate German language skills at Level B1 GER or its equivalent, for instance a school leaving certificate. As an incentive, the residential requirement for applicants with high levels of integration, for instance language skills at B2 GER, is reduced to six years.
• In order to demonstrate knowledge of German society, the 2007 reform required applicants to pass a harmonised naturalisation test, which was introduced with effect from 1 September 2008. In the test, which costs €25 to sit and can be repeated indefinitely, candidates have to answer 33 out of a possible 330 multiple-choice 13 questions, with 17 correct responses required to pass. Any applicant who has successfully completed school in Germany is exempted.
• In Section 16, the revised law supplemented the (now amended) written statement of loyalty with an aural declaration to be made at the time of the presentation of the naturalisation certificate.
• Lastly, in Section 12 (2), the post-2007 law now automatically permits dual citizenship for all applicants from EU member-states and Switzerland.
But the 2007 reforms also included two additional changes, each of which has in fact served to raise the bar for naturalisation. First, the existing provision that applicants should be free of criminal convictions was amended. Ever since this had been introduced in 1990, sentences of up to six months' prison or an equivalent fine (Tagessätze) did not exclude candidates from naturalisation. However, post-2007, under Section 12a of the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, the limit has been halved to three months, and offences will now be counted cumulatively, not individually.
Even more significant though is a change affecting those non-nationals aged between 18 and 23: hitherto, they were excluded from the requirement in Section 10 to provide for themselves and their dependants. This has now been removed, thereby adding a potentially major exclusionary hurdle: given that non-nationals in Germany have disproportionately low education and high unemployment outcomes, the chances of applicants in this age group being able to support themselves financially are in all likelihood slight. In particular, Worbs' analysis demonstrates clearly that the desire to retain one's citizenship is the principal reason why both Turks and the citizens of former Yugoslavia, the two largest national groups among Germany's immigrants, choose not apply for naturalisation. What is more, the second most important reason is that their residence is already secure, indicating that these two national groups see little material advantage in becoming German.
Overall, given its initial aim, it is clear that the 2000 law has been a disappointment in quantitative terms and falls well short of the high expectations invested in it at the time of 
Other issues and challenges
As Germany's revised citizenship law enters its second decade, its relatively low quantitative impact is not the only challenge it faces, as four main technical and administrative issues have 21 also become apparent, some of which will have a significant bearing on the future direction of citizenship policy.
First and foremost of these is the future of the Optionsmodell, under which the over 350,000
beneficiaries of jus soli to date will have to opt-in to German citizenship by obtaining release Instead, the size and composition of the respective Land's non-national population appears to be a better guide to likely outcomes in this area, although political leadership can still obviously play a role at the margins (Green 2005, pp. 931-932 ). More prosaically, the level of administrative resources available to a state in processing applications is also likely to affect outcomes in this area (Hagedorn, 2001, p. 172) .
The third issue is related to the second and concerns the way the state administrative structures deal with applicants for naturalisation (Lämmermann 2009, pp. 295-296) . In doing so, the article shows that the development of Germany's citizenship policy is now clearly in step with the overall trend across the EU. With the increased focus on language tests as a precondition for naturalisation, flanked by the recent introduction of citizenship tests and ceremonies, there is broad convergence with what has become a more-or-less standard constellation of policy instruments in Europe (cf. Vink and de Groot 2010). Nonetheless, the analysis reiterates that important insights can be gained from the study of individual country cases. As this article has shown, the details of Germany's provisions for jus soli mean that it cannot easily be slotted into a given category; similarly, its approach to dual and multiple citizenships is more complex than simple opposition. Even a consideration of Germany's naturalisation rate does not capture the full impact of its citizenship policies across the board.
Certainly, there are many specificities that could not be touched on here for reasons of space, especially those pertaining to the politics, ideology and identity of citizenship, and the reader is referred to the range of influential contributions which already exist on these questions (e.g. Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009 , Palmowski 2008 , Green 2005 .
Overall, and for all the problems with the new law, it is worth remarking on the degree to which the historically high levels of naturalisation, which have now been sustained for a It is also worth returning briefly to the question of whether Germany, by virtue not of the content but of the relatively exclusive outcome of its citizenship law, retains an ethnocultural colouring in its definition of membership. Certainly, the cumulative impact of the 2000 reform, including in dual citizenship, has helped this colouring to fade further, although not as much as would have been the case had dual citizenship been accepted unequivocally. But an ethnocultural tinge was also provided by ethnic German immigrants (Spätaussiedler), whose privileged immigration conditions and automatic naturalisation, including full dual citizenship, created a situation where it was tempting to conclude that 'ethnicity provides an edge that mere residence and payment of taxes does not' (Green 2000 , p. 118, also Brubaker 1992 . This was of particular significance during the early 1990s, when the very high German. This startling revelation has helped to shift policy debates away from the hitherto prevalent 'us' and 'them' discourse, which is certain to change perceptions about citizenship in the medium term.
However, in the meantime, Germany will continue to grapple with the challenge not just of making access to its citizenry easier in principle, but also of achieving this in practice.
Important as the post-2000 increases in naturalisation are, the baseline is so low that, on current trends, the non-national population in Germany will remain broadly constant in size, it will be increasingly well-settled and, especially among the older group of first generation immigrants, effectively permanently excluded from political participation. Of course, it is a moot point whether it is incumbent on non-nationals to seek naturalisation so that they can participate, or on the host state to ensure that this is an attractive option to them. But this misses the key point that Germany as a country and a polity loses far more in terms of legitimacy than individual non-nationals do through non-participation in the political process.
That being the case, the debate over the content, direction and impact of Germany's citizenship legislation looks set to remain on the agenda for some years yet. Percentage tolerated
